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CASE NOTE
PUBLIC LANDS-The Road Less Traveled: The 10th Circuit Adjudicates
R.S. 2477 Claims Using a Piecemeal State-Law Approach Instead of a
Uniform Federal Policy; Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of
Land Management, 425 E3d 735 (10th Cir. 2005).
Joseph Azbell*
INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 1996 road crews employed by San Juan, Garfield, and Kane
counties (hereinafter the "Counties") began construction on sixteen "roads" that
ran through Bureau of Land Management (BLM) controlled lands in southern
Utah.1 Armed with graders and other earth-moving equipment, the Counties
began to improve the existing primitive trails into graded roadways without permission or notification to the BLM.2 With a few exceptions, the claimed rightsof-way were never previously graded by the Counties, although a few appeared to
show signs of previous construction.' The Counties asserted ownership of several
routes pursuant to Revised Statute 2477 (R.S. 2477), a Civil War-era law which
granted rights-of-way for the "construction" of "highways" over public lands.4
R.S. 2477 was repealed by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA). 5 FLPMA, however, contained a savings clause which permitted R.S.
6
2477 claims perfected as of 1976 to continue to be valid.
Nine of the asserted rights-of-way are located in the Grand Staircase-Escalante
National Monument; six are situated in wilderness study areas; and six others
7
lie on a mesa overlooking the Needles District of Canyonlands National Park.
Given the location of the claimed routes, it did not take long for conservation
groups such as the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) to take notice.8
On October 2, 1996, SUWA filed suit against the BLM to force the agency
*University of Wyoming, J.D. Candidate 2008. Thanks to Professor Debra Donahue and
Janet Azbell.
'Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Management, 425 E3d 735,742 (10th
Cir. 2005) [hereinafter SUWA I].
2

Id.

3

Id.

' Id. The meaning of the terms "construction" and "highway" are disputed in the principal
case. See, e.g,. injra notes 92-93 and accompanying text for discussion of "highways" and note 99
and accompanying text for a discussion of "construction."
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000).
6 Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 701(a), 90 Stat. 2743 (1976).

7SUWA II, 425 F.3d at 742.
8
Id.at 742.
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to protect the "stunning red-rock canyon formations" and "pristine wilderness
areas." 9 This lawsuit kicked off a nine-year court battle which culminated in the
principal United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit case, Southern
Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau ofLand Management.
The procedural path leading to the current case was lengthy and convoluted.'0
In the initial 1996 suit brought by SUWA against the BLM and the Counties, the
BLM filed cross-claims against the Counties, alleging trespass and degradation of
federal property." The BLM sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as
damages to restore the areas. 12 Despite objections from the Counties, the district
court stayed the proceedings to allow the BLM to determine whether the routes
in question were valid rights-of-way pursuant to R.S. 2477.13 Lacking title records
or any formal recording process, the BLM sought old maps, photographs, maintenance records, and public testimony to determine whether the Counties had
established R.S. 2477 rights-of-way prior to 1976.14 To aid in its determinations
concerning validity of the rights-of-way, the BLM applied its own interpretations
of the statutory language of R.S. 2477 instead of referring to Utah state law as
suggested by the Counties. 5 The district court held that the BLM had primary
jurisdiction over the claims and thus reviewed the BLM's voluminous findings
concerning the history of the alleged rights-of-way under an arbitrary and
capricious standard. 6 Having found that the BLM acted neither arbitrarily nor
capriciously, the district court held that the Counties lacked valid rights-of-way
on fifteen of the sixteen roads, and that Kane County had exceeded the scope on
the sixteenth road. 7 The court did, however, find in favor of the Counties on the
trespass issues.' 8 The Counties appealed the decision to the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals, claiming that the district court erred in granting the BLM primary
jurisdiction and that the BLM should not have relied on its own interpretation of
the statute but instead should follow state law.'

9Id.
Only the salient procedural history will be given here. For a more complete summary, see

10

SUWA II, 425 F.3d 735, 742-44 (10th Cir. 2005).
" SUWA II, 425 F.3d at 742-43.
12Id.

'3 1d.at 743.
14I.As will be discussed infra, the public acceptance of an R.S. 2477 grant required no formal
action on the part of local governments, and the grantee was not required to record title. See also
SUWA II, 425 F3d at 741.

" Id.at 759.
16

Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Management, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1130,

1134 (D. Utah 2001) [hereinafter SUWA 1].
171d.at 1137.

"1SUWA II, 425 F.3d at 744.
19Id.at 758.
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This case note will concern itself with only one of the Tenth Circuit's most
controversial holdings, that concerning primary jurisdiction. 2' The court held
that Congress did not grant the BLM authority to make binding determinations
regarding the existence of valid R.S. 2477 claims. 21Therefore, the court concluded
"that the BLM lacks primary jurisdiction and that the district court abused its
discretion by deferring to the BLM. 22 Consequently, "a remand [was] required
to permit the district court to conduct a plenary review and resolution of the R.S.
2477 claims. ,23 On remand the Tenth Circuit directed the district court to apply
Utah state law to determine the validity of the R.S. 2477 claims.24
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit made no specific findings concerning the sixteen
roads. 25 However, the holdings it reached and precedents it set are certain to have
far-reaching effects for those living in the West. 26 This case note will explore the
controversial history of R.S. 2477 and identify the actors that make this seemingly
simple law so contentious. Next, it will analyze the principal case and argue that
the court incorrectly decided the issue of primary jurisdiction. Finally, this note
will discuss the future of R.S. 2477, and argue that Congress should act to create
a unified process in which to resolve these disputes.
BACKGROUND

In the 1860s, filled with the spirit of "manifest destiny," eastern settlers rapidly
27
began homesteading on the newly acquired territories in the American West.

2 Id. at 757. Black's Law Dictionary defines primary jurisdiction as "[a] judicial doctrine

whereby a court tends to favor allowing an agency an initial opportunity to decide an issue in a case
in which the court and the agency have concurrent jurisdiction." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1208
(Deluxe 7th ed. 1999).
21 SUWA II, 425 E3d at 757.
22 Id. The court summed up its argument by stating "nothing in the terms of R.S. 2477 gives

the BLM authority to make binding determinations on the validity of the rights of way granted
thereunder, and we decline to infer such authority from silence when the statute creates no executive
role for the BLM." Id. at 758.
23SUWA II, 425 F.3d at 758.
24

Id. at 768.
758.

25 Id. at

26 The BLM manages roughly 258 million acres of land, most of which is located in twelve

western states. BLM, BLM Facts, http://www.blm.gov/nhp/facts/index.htm (last visited March 8,
2007). It should be noted that while BLM-managed lands are in question in this case, the Tenth
Circuit's decision has implications for all federally managed lands as well as private lands acquired
from the federal government. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Property Owners for Sensible
Roads Policy et al. in Support of Affirmance of the District Court's Orders and in Support of
Appellees Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, Sierra Club, & the BLM, SUWA v. BLM, 425 F.3d
735 (10th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 04-4071, 04-4073).
27 John Warfield Simpson, VISIONS OF PARADISE: GLIMPSES OF OUR LANDSCAPE'S LEGACY 98
(University of California Press 1999).
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To encourage future growth and validate existing settlements, Congress enacted
a series of laws, including the Mining Law of 1866.28 Now codified in part as
R.S. 2477, this statute contains few words and is seemingly straightforward. R.S.
2477 reads, in its entirety: "the right-of-way for the construction of highways over
29
public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted.
More than a hundred years later, amidst the cultural transformations of the
1970s, Congress passed FLMPA.3 ' FLPMA marked a change in the relationship
of the American people vis- -vis the land.31 Instead of promoting the disposal
of public lands and private settlement, the goals of FLPMA were conservation,
preservation, multiple use, and retention of federal lands.3 2 Consistent with this
policy, FLPMA expressly repealed R.S. 2477.13 However, in an innocuous sounding savings clause, FLPMA permitted those R.S. 2477 rights-of-way perfected
prior to October 1, 1976, to remain in existence.34 Thousands of R.S. 2477 claims
35
are still in existence, and their validity remains uncertain.
Despite the relatively uncontroversial history of R.S. 2477 prior to 1976,
the death of the statute has, ironically, sparked considerable controversy for a
variety of reasons.3 6 Chief among these reasons are the uncertainty surrounding
the statute's interpretation and implementation, inconsistent state and federal
7
court opinions, and increased litigation.

Statutory Uncertainty
38
Revised Statute 2477 has lead to much uncertainty for a variety of reasons.
First, the sparse language of the statute and legislative history give little guid-

28See Brett Birdsong, Road Rage and R.S. 2477: Judicialand Administrative Responsibilityfor
Resolving Road Claims on Public Lands, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 523, 526 (2005).
29 43 U.S.C. § 932 (repealed in 1976 by FLPMA). R.S. 2477 is part of the original 1866
Mining Law. See SUWA II, 425 F.3d 735, 740 (10th Cit. 2005).
3043 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000).
31SUWA I, 425 F.3d at 740.
32See 43 U.S.C.

§

1701 (2000).

33Id.

43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000).
3' As

of 1993, the Department of the Interior stated there were approximately 5,600 pending R.S. 2477 claims. U.S. Dep't of Interior, Report to Congress on R.S. 2477: The History and
Management of R.S. 2477 Claims on Federal and Other Lands 29 (June 1993) (microfiche available
at University of Wyoming, Coe Library) [hereinafter DOI Rep. to Congress].
31Michael J Wolter, Revised Statute 2477 Rights-of-Way Settlement Act: Exorcism or Exercise for
the Ghost of Land Use Past?, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 315, 317-18 (1996).
17 See infta

notes 38-109 and accompanying text.

38Wolter, supra note 36, at 319.
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ance on how the public establishes a valid R.S. 2477 right-of-way.39 Second, "the
establishment of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way required no administrative formalities:
no entry, no application, no license, no patent, and no deed on the federal side;
no formal act of public acceptance on the part of the states or localities in whom
the right was vested."4 °Therefore, it is often difficult to determine whether a valid
right-of-way was established prior to the statute's repeal.4"

State Law
Contributing to the uncertainty is the inconsistency of state case law.4 2 The
BLM has allowed states to interpret R.S. 2477 with the aid of state law. 43 Disputes
that arose in state courts prior to 1976 usually involved adjudicating "claims by
private landowners asserting access rights across neighbor's [sic] property." "4 These
cases usually did not involve any federal interests and, thus, the federal government rarely made an appearance.45 In the absence of federal participation, states
46
construed R.S. 2477 liberally and applied various standards taken from state law.
According to a 1993 Report to Congress from the Department of the Interior:
Some state statutes contain language that is very broad, while
others specifically lay out definitions and formal procedures.
In other states, only formal petitions through public officials
are sufficient to establish a highway. Some statutes declare that
public use of a road over time can establish a highway. Other
statutes set forth definitions of highways that are open to interpretation. Many states have enacted multiple statutes providing
for several factors that may operate to establish a highway. Some
state statutes refer to undocumented roads.47
There are, however, some principles that seem to be fairly established by state
law.48 Courts have generally held that the federal government, by enacting R.S.
2477, was making an offer to the public for the establishment of highways.49 As
3

9 Id.

11SUWA II, 425 F.3d 735, 741 (10th Cir. 2005).
41Id.
42

Id.

43 For example, the terms "construction" and "highway" were interpreted by reference to state

law. See, e.g., SUWA II, 425 F.3d at 762.
' Birdsong, supra note 28, at 527.
45Id.
46 Id. at 527. Moreover, the state law that does exist generally does not deal with R.S. 2477
directly but focused on the issue of public highways. DOI Rep. to Congress, supra note 35, at 15.
17 DOI Rep. to Congress, supra note 35, at 15.
41Wolter, supra note 36, at 328.
49 See Wolter, supra note 36, at 327 (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 39,218 (Aug. 1, 1994)).
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Wolter stated, "[s] tate law governs the terms of acceptance and scope of the rightof-way, insofar as those terms consist with those of the offer."50 There are limits
imposed by the language of R.S. 2477 on how a state can make its acceptance. 5
For example, many states attempted to accept the offer of R.S. 2477 highways
52
by enacting legislation that would create a road on every map section line.
Interior Secretary Bliss, in 1898, rejected one such attempt by Douglas County,
Washington, and stated that the idea "embodies the manifestation of a marked
and novel liberality on the part of the county authorities dealing with the public
53
land."
A 2003 Wyoming Supreme Court opinion illustrates how the application of
state law governs R.S. 2477 claims. 54 In this case, a rancher brought suit to enjoin
55
recreationists from using a trail across his property to access a national forest.
56
The recreationists claimed that an R.S. 2477 right-of-way had been established.
The court found that a 1919 Wyoming statute was controlling on the issue regarding the establishment of a valid R.S. 2477 right-of-way. 57 The statute "effectively
vacated the public status of any road, including those established pursuant to R.S.
2477, which [sic] were not recorded and established by the pertinent board of
county commissioners." 58 Thus the claimed R.S. 2477 right-of-way was invalid
59
because the road was not registered with the state as required by Wyoming law.
In addition to state case law, federal case law has fleshed out some important
principles concerning R.S. 2477. As will be discussed below, however, federal
courts have generally reached inconsistent results.

FederalCases
Despite R.S. 24 77's 100-plus-year existence, there is relatively little federal
case law concerning this statute. 60 Most of the cases that do exist were decided
50Wolter, supra note 36, at 328. See also Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cit. 1988)

(discussing the application of state law to establish scope of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way).
5! Wolter, supra note 36, at 328.
52

DOI Rep. to Congress, supra note 35, at 15. The establishment of these "highways" would

have checkered the country at one mile intervals. See Douglas County, Washington, 26 Pub. Lands
Dec. 446 (U.S. Dept. of Int. 1898).
51Douglas County, Washington, 26 Pub. Lands Dec. 446 (U.S. Dept. of Int. 1898).
54

Yeager v. Forbes, 78 P.3d 241 (Wyo. 2003).

55Id.at 245.
56Id.at 255.
57Id.The 1919 statute was amended in a 1920 statute which was codified as Wyo. Stat. Ann.

§ 24-1-101. See Yeager, 78 P3d at 251.
51 Yeager, 78 P.3d at 255.
59Id.

0Birdsong, supra note 28, at 528.
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after 1976.61 One reason for the paucity of cases is that the federal government's
primary goal prior to 1976 was the quick disposal of land, therefore, there was little
need for federal litigation over these property rights.62 Additionally, the grant of
the right-of-way was self-executing and required no formal process of recognition
by the federal government. 63 According to a 1993 Department of Interior Report
to Congress, the federal cases had "established no clear judicial precedents." '
There are, however, some federal precedents that have wide approval. In
general, courts have held that R.S. 2477 applied both retrospectively and prospectively.65 One of the first Supreme Court cases to discuss R.S. 2477 was Central
Pacific Railway Co. v. Alameda County.66 In Central Pacific, the Court held that
a road established prior to the enactment of the statute was afforded protection
under R.S. 2477, and that the statute applied retrospectively and amounted to
congressional recognition of pre-existing rights. 67 Most federal courts have also
held that R.S. 2477 rights apply equally to roads used for mining and homesteading purposes as to other purposes. 6' Furthermore, an R.S. 2477 right-of-way is

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

43 C.ER. § 244.58 (1939) ("No application should be filed under R.S. 2477, as no action

on the part of the Government is necessary.").
' See DOI Rep. to Congress, supra note 35, at 16.
65 DOI Rep. to Congress, supra note 35, at 16. ContraUnited States v. Dunn, 478 E2d 443
(9th Cir. 1973) (holding that R.S. 2477 applied only to rights which existed prior to 1866-the
statute's enactment-and did not establish any new rights after 1866).
' Cent. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Alameda County, 284 U.S. 463 (1932). The Supreme Court also
addressed R.S. 2477 in Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228 (1925). In that case the State of Colorado
passed a bill that forbade the superintendent of Rocky Mountain National Park from establishing a
monopoly over R.S. 2477 rights-of-way across the park in a scheme for profit. Id.at 229. The Court
stated that the statute creating the park did not affect the preexisting rights of private landholders
or the state, particularly the right to use the road. Id. at 231. The statute also did not, absent an act
of cession from the state and acceptance from the national government, curtail the jurisdiction of
the state. Id.Thus the Court ordered an injunction to prevent the superintendent from continuing
actions in which he lacked authority. Id.
67 Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 284 U.S. at 471. In CentralPacific,the railroad company sued Alameda
County in an action to quiet title on a right-of-way used as a railroad track. Id.at 465. Prior to the
railroad track, there had been a public highway through the same steep canyon. Id.at 455-66. Flood
waters forced the highway to be moved from one side of the canyon to the other, putting the railroad
right-of-way in conflict with the proposed road. Id. at 466. The original road was established by
the county, in accordance with state law, "by the passage of wagons, etc., over the natural soil." Id.
at 467. Central Pacific claimed that Alameda County had no right to the highway because it was
established in 1859, twenty-seven years prior to R.S. 2477. Id. at 467. The Court disagreed and
stated that Congress acquiesced to the public's use and establishment of highways, and therefore
R.S. 2477 was a voluntary recognition of preexisting rights. Id.at 471.
6' DOI Rep. to Congress, supra note 35, at 16. The DOI report noted:
The vast majority of cases have found that highway rights-of-way are not
limited to the mining and homesteading context. The common logic is that
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property which must be compensated by the government if taken by eminent
domain.6 9 Finally, most courts agree that an R.S. 2477 right-of-way must be
70
accepted by state action, although public use is generally sufficient.
The Tenth Circuit has been involved in greater litigation over the subject
than most circuits, with cases from Utah being common. 71 One of the most
important cases from that state is Sierra Club v. Hode. 72 Hodel arose in the early
1990s after Garfield County sought to significantly improve the existing Burr
Trail in southern Utah. 73 Conservation groups brought suit in district court to
force the BLM to stop the county's construction.74 They argued that an R.S.
2477 right-of-way had not been created; that even if it had, Garfield County had
exceeded the scope of the right-of-way; and that an environmental impact statement was required because the BLM's participation in the project amounted to
"major federal action. ,75 The district court stated that, according to Tenth Circuit
precedent:
[Ilnitial determination of whether activity falls within an established right-of-way is to be made by the BLM and not by the
court. The court should pay considerable deference to the BLM's
experience in examining the stakes, determining traffic patterns

section 8 of the 1866 act has been reenacted, in a distinct and independent
statute, Revised Statute 2477, separate from the other provisions of the 1866
Mining Act.

Id.
69United States v. 9,947.71 Acres of Land, 220 F.Supp. 328, 337 (D. Nev. 1963) (holding that

an R.S. 2477 right-of-way is property that is subject to compensation if taken by the government).
70 See, e.g., Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 E2d 842 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that the State's
contract to build a road to assist in pipeline construction was sufficient to accept the R.S. 2477
right-of-way).
71 Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 122 P.3d 556 (Utah 2005); Southern Utah Wilderness
Alliance v. Bureau of Land Management, 425 E3d 735 (10th Cit. 2005); San Juan County, Utah v.
United States, 420 E3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2005); Sierra Club v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 362 (10th Cit. 1991);
Wilderness Society v. Kane County, Utah, 2006 WL 2471518 (D. Utah 2006); Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance v. National Park Service, 387 ESupp. 2d 1178 (D. Utah 2005); Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance v. Babbitt, 2000 WL 33914094 *1 (D. Utah 2000); United States v. Garfield
County, 122 E Supp. 2d 1201 (D. Utah 2000); Washington County v. United States, 1996 WL

590911 *1(D.Utah 1996).
72Sierra Club v. Hodel, 675 F.Supp. 594 (D.Utah 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 848 E2d
1068 (10th Cir. 1988).
71Sierra Club, 675
71Id.

E Supp. at 596.

at 594.

75

Id.at 599. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) mandates that an EIS is required
for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C.

§ 4332(C) (2000).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss2/7
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and evaluating the impact of the project on the surrounding
76
environment.
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the Sierra Club conceded the existence of the
right-of-way but renewed its argument that the scope of the right-of-way had been
exceeded. 77 The appeals court concurred with the district court that the BLM was
permitted to make initial determinations, noting that the "district court based its
findings of fact largely on the testimony and exhibits of several BLM experts. '78
However, contrary to the Sierra Club's contention, the Tenth Circuit held that
state law, not federal law, governed the scope of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way. 79 The
court did not reach the issue concerning whether state or federal law governs the
establishment of a valid R.S. 2477 right-of-way.80
These federal cases leave many unresolved questions concerning R.S. 2477.81
What is the relationship between state and federal law? How does R.S. 2477
interact with FLPMA's goals? Is actual construction required or can "mere use" be
sufficient? To what does the term "highway" refer?

Agency Policies
The BLM and its parent agency, the Department of Interior (DOI), have
been inconsistent in how they have interpreted and applied R.S. 2477 through
82
the years.
Prior to 1976, consistent with the policy of federal land disposal, there was
little DOI guidance on R.S. 2477.83 In fact, from 1866 to 1898 the DOI provided no regulations.84 In 1898, the Secretary of the Interior declared unlawful an
attempt by Douglas County, Washington, to dedicate sections lines as R.S. 2477
rights-of-way.85 In 1938, the DOI stated, for the first time, that an R.S. 2477

76

Id. at 606 (citing City and County of Denver v. Bergland, 695 E2d 465, 481 (10th Cir.

1982)).
77Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 E2d. 1068, 1079 (10th Cir. 1988).
78Id.at 1085 (citing Bergland,695 E2d at 481).
79Id.at 1080. In reaching this conclusion the court found the following relevant: BLM regulations supporting the application of state law, congressional acquiescence in the use of state law, and
state court precedents applying state law to determine perfection of an R.S. 2477 right of way. Id.at
1082. Applying Utah state law, the court held that the county retains all rights to the roads as they
existed in 1976. Id.at 1083.
0Id.at 1079.
SI

DOI Rep. to Congress, supra note 35, at 12.

82Wolter, supra note 36, at 317-18.
83 DOI Rep. to Congress, supra note 35, at 15; Birdsong, supra note 28, at 527.
84

DOI Rep. to Congress, supra note 35, at 20.

85See Douglas County Wash., 26 Pub. Lands Dec. 446 (U.S. Dept. of Int. 1898).
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grant becomes effective "upon the construction or establishment of highways,
in accordance with state laws, over public lands not reserved for public uses. No
application should be filed under the act, as no action on the part of the federal
government is necessary."8 6 This policy was reestablished several times prior to
1976.87 A 1955 "decision by the DOI shows that R.S. 2477 was considered an
authority by which highways could be established across public lands."88
After the repeal of R.S. 2477 in 1976, the DOI and the BLM became more
active in their management of federal lands and rights-of-way therein.89 In 1979,
the BLM, after realizing the need to manage valid, existing rights-of-way, initially
proposed regulations which would have required claimants to file rights-of-way
claims within three years.90 When the final regulations were proposed, the filing
requirement became optional; later, the three-year filing window was dropped
altogether.91 In 1994, following a DOI Report detailing the history and management problems associated with R.S. 2477, the BLM again proposed a rule "to
clarify the meaning of the statute and provide a workable administrative process
and standards for recognizing valid claims. '92 To this end, the proposed regulation would have defined "construction" to require actual, physical construction,
and "highway" to require an open public road connecting "places between which
people or goods traveled." 93 The proposed rule was never adopted because, in
1996, before publishing of the final regulations, Congress passed an omnibus bill
that prohibited all rulemaking regarding R.S. 2477. 9'
Aside from the agency rulemaking, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed many
informal policies adopted by DOI solicitors. In 1980, the Interior Solicitor, concerned about the inconsistent court precedents and management of R.S. 2477
under FLPMA, sent a letter to the Assistant Attorney General of the Department

86 43 C.ER.
87

§ 244.55 (1938).

See DOI Rep. to Congress, supra note 35, at 20.
4

88 DOI Rep. to Congress, supra note 35, at 20; see 3 C.ER. § 2822.2-2 (1970).
89 For

example, FLMPA, passed in 1976, required federal land managers to actively manage

federal lands and develop extensive land use plans. 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2000).
90 43 C.F.R. § 2802.3-6 (1979). The proposed regulations would have required a project
description, an environmental protection plan, and a detailed map. Id. Additionally, the proposed
regulation provided a process for granting or denying the application. 43 C.F.R. § 2802.4 (1979).
The application could be denied if the proposed right-of-way was not in the public interest or if the
applicant did not demonstrate the financial or technical capability to complete the construction. Id.
The requirements necessary to establish the existence of the road, however, were noticeably absent
from the proposed rule. See Id.
9143 C.ER. § 2802.3-6 (1980); 43 C.F.R. § 2802.3 (1982).
92 59 Fed. Reg. 39216 (Aug. 1, 1994).
93Id.

9' 110 Stat. 3009-200 (1996).
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of Justice, Land and Natural Resources Division. 95 The solicitor, interpreting
R.S. 2477, stated that the federal grant of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way applied
prospectively; the validity of any claim was a matter of federal law; the phrase
"land not reserved for public use" applied to Indian reservations, wildlife refuges,
and national parks; and R.S. 2477 required actual construction, not mere use of
96
a route over time.
In 1988, DOI Secretary Hodel, in response to what was perceived to be Alaska's
unique problem of having an underdeveloped transportation system, adopted the
so-called Hodel Policy, which defined the criteria for the perfection of an R.S.
2477 right-of-way.97 The term "construction" was interpreted broadly to allow
establishment by mere foot or animal travel, "highways" could be established by
the expenditure of government monies, and the federal government was said to
have neither the duty nor the authority to adjudicate claims.98
In 1997, DOI Secretary Babbitt instituted the "Babbitt Policy" in response
to Congress' prohibition on final rulemaking regarding the resolution of R.S.
2477 claims.9 9 The Babbitt Policy expressly revoked the Hodel Policy, and allowed
agency determinations concerning the validity of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way only in
situations where there was a pressing need to do so.' 1° According to the Babbitt
Policy, R.S. 2477 claims were to be decided by the application of state law which
existed at the time of R.S. 24 77's repeal, but only "to the extent that it is consistent
with federal law."''
In sum, this review of relevant state, federal, and DOI precedent demonstrates that the historical interpretations of R.S. 2477 have provided few clear
guidelines. 1 2 There are four reasons for the confusion. First, the statutory lan-

95Letter from Deputy Solicitor Frederick Ferguson, to Hon. James W Moorman, Standardsto
be Applied in DeterminingWhether Highways Have Been Establishedunder the Repealed Statute R.S.
2477 (43 U.S.C 932), 2 (Apr. 28, 1980) (copy available in DOI Rep. to Congress, supra note 35,
at appendix).
96Id. at 2-5.
9'DOI Rep. to Congress, supra note 35, at 21-22. The goal of the Hodel Policy was to establish
criteria in which federal land managers and interested parties could recognize the existence of R.S.
2477 claims and apply these criteria to all lands under DOI jurisdiction. Id. at 23.
9'Id. at 23-24. See also Memorandum from Secretary of the Interior, Gale Norton, to Assistant
Secretaries of Land and Minerals Management, Fish, Wildlife, and Parks, Indian Affairs, and Water
and Science Departmental Implementation of SUWA v. BLM 2 (Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter
"Norton Memo"] (copy located in DOI Rep. to Congress, supra note 35, at appendix).
99See Norton Memo, supra note 98, at attachment 1, 2.
"' See id.While the Hodel Policy permitted broad determinations of the validity of R.S. 2477
claims, the Babbitt Policy restricted agency determinations to rare situations in which a "claimant
demonstrated an immediate and compelling need for a determination." Id.
101Id

.02
Birdsong, supra note 28, at 531.
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guage and legislative history of R.S. 2477 are shrouded in mystery."°3 Second,
the granting of the right-of-way required no formal action of recognition on the
part of the government. Thus, often few records exist to determine the validity of
a claimed right-of-way.10 4 Third, the paucity of federal case law concerning R.S.
2477, coupled with often inconsistent state cases, has created much confusion in
interpreting the statute. 0 5 Finally, there has been a lack of uniformity in determining rights-of-way by the BLM and DOI throughout the statute's lifetime.'0 6
By 1996, all of the various threads had coalesced to knot up the courts with
confusion and uncertainty. 107 Against this backdrop the Southern Utah Wilderness
Alliance filed its case in Utah federal district court. The Tenth Circuit's resolution
of the case in 2005 now forms the guidepost for DOI/BLM policy nationwide.0 8
Thus, in a sense, it is a step toward clarity. However, it has also opened a Pandora's
box. 109
PRINCIPAL CASE

In October of 1996, SUWA brought suit in federal court against the BLM
and the Counties, claiming the Counties were engaging in unlawful road building
activities and the BLM was unlawfully acquiescing to the Counties." 0 The BLM
cross-claimed against the Counties, alleging trespass in violation of FLPMA."'
The district court stayed the proceedings to allow the BLM to make an initial
determination of the validity of the Counties' claims." 2 After the BLM concluded
that fifteen of the sixteen rights-of-way were invalid and that the scope of one of
the rights-of-way was exceeded, SUWA sought summary judgment in the district
court to enforce the BLM's findings." 3 The district court, interpreting the motion
for summary judgment as an agency appeal, discussed the validity of the BLM's
findings in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) arbitrary
and capricious standard." 4

Id. at 526.
II, 425 E3d 735, 741 (10th Cir. 2005).

103

104SUWA

105Norton

Memo, supra note 98, at attachment 1, 6.
106SUWA II, 425 E3d at 760.
107Wolter,

supra note 36, at 319; Birdsong, supra note 28, at 527-33.
'" Norton Memo, supra note 98, at 1.
109

See infra notes 166-77 and accompanying text.

'0 SUWA v. BLM, No. 96-836, slip op. at 2-3 (D. Utah May 11, 1998). Specifically, SUWA
claimed the Counties violated FLPMA, the Antiquities Act, and the National Environmental Policy
Act. SUWA I, 425 E3d at 742.
"'
112

SUWA II, 425 E3d at 742-43.
Id. at 743.

113Id.
114

SUWA 1, 147 E Supp.2d at 1136. The APA requires a court to review a final action to

determine whether the action is arbitrary or capricious. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A) (2000).
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District Court (SUWA I)
The court began its analysis by discussing the proper scope of review for
informal agency adjudications under the APA. 115 The court asserted that the
proper standard of review for the agency's factual conclusions was an arbitrary
or capricious standard.'16 An arbitrary or capricious standard, which the Tenth
Circuit interprets as requiring "an administrative agency determination ... [to]
be supported by 'substantial evidence' found in the administrative record as a
whole."' 17 On the other hand, review of an agency's statutory interpretation, if
made in an "informal policy statements and opinion letters, rather than a formal
rule or regulation," is given Skidmore deference." 8 Under Skidmore, an agency's
interpretation is given deference only if it has the "power to persuade."' 9
With these standards in place, the court moved to the substantive issues
of the case. It began by reviewing the factual record and determined that the
Counties failed to carry their burden of proving the BLM acted arbitrarily and
capriciously." 0 Specifically, the court found the BLM's conclusions-that all of
the rights-of-way claimed by the Counties were invalid, save one-were supported by the "substantial evidence" required, and, therefore, it upheld the BLM's
determinations. 121
115

SUWA1, 147 F. Supp.2d 1130, 1133 (D. Utah 2001).
116 Id.
See also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The definition of this standard comes from a United
States Supreme Court decision, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.State Farm Mut.Auto Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983), which states that an agency decision is arbitrary and capricious if.
the agency has relied on factors which Congress had not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered
an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not ascribed to a difference in view or
the product of agency expertise.
Motor Vehicle, 463 U.S. at 43.
117SUWA I, 147 E Supp. 2d at 1136-37 (citing Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42
F.3d 1560, 1575 (10th Cir. 1994)). According to Olenhouse:
Where questions of due process and sufficiency of the evidence are raised
on appeal from an agency's final decision, the district court must review the
agency's decisionmaking process and conduct a plenary review of the facts
underlying the challenged action. It must find and identify substantialevidence
to support the agency's action and may affirm agency action, if at all, only on the
groundsarticulatedby the agency itself
42 E3d at 1566 (emphasis added).
...
SUWA I, 147 E Supp. 2d at 1135 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
"9 Id. at 1135 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
Id.

120

11 Id. at 1137-38. The court did not discuss how the record supported each and every invalida-

tion of the Counties' claims, but summarily stated that "[t]he amount and nature of the evidence
presented in support of each of the BLM's determinations iscertainly more than a mere scintilla,
is
sufficient to support the agency's conclusions, and is not outweighed by contrary evidence." SUWA
I, 147 R Supp. 2d at 1137.
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Two years after the district court ruled on SUWA I the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals decided the case on appeal. 22
Tenth Circuit CourtofAppeals (SUWA II)
In SUWA II, the court addressed the issue of primary jurisdiction over R.S.
123
2477 rights-of-way and ultimately found that the doctrine did not apply.
First, the court noted that "[tihe circuits are split over the standard of review
of decisions whether to recognize the primary jurisdiction of an administrative
agency."' 124 The Tenth, Fourth, and District of Columbia Circuits apply an abuse
of discretion standard; the First, Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits apply a de
125
novo standard to the decision over whether to recognize primary jurisdiction.
The court ultimately chose to follow Tenth Circuit precedent and apply the
former standard. 126 Under the abuse of discretion standard, courts can disturb
the BLM's factual findings only if they are arbitrary or capricious. 27 The court
set forth the following framework for determining whether primary jurisdiction
applied. First, a court must determine whether Congress has "given authority over
the issue to an administrative agency."1 28 Second, the court must consider whether
the reasons and purposes for primary jurisdiction are present. 2 9 The reasons for
primary jurisdiction are twofold. 30 First, the doctrine is used to promote uniformity.'31 Second, it allows those with special expertise to adjudicate issues that are
not normally fully understood by judges. 32 If all of these elements are present, a
133
court will apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

SUWA I, 425 F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 2005). Initially, the appeals court rejected the Counties'

122

request for repeal for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that it could not rule on the case until the
district made a final order as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. SUWA v. BLM, 69 Fed. Appx. 927
(10th Cir. 2003). Shortly thereafter, the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance went to the district

court, seeking injunctive relief and damages. SUWA II, 425 F3d at 744. The district granted these
requests, and the Counties, now with a final order to appeal, brought the case to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals where review was granted. Id.

SUWA II, 425 F.3d at 757.

123
124

Id. at 750.

125

Id.

126Id.
127

SUWA I,425 E3d at 750.

121Id.at 751.
129
130
131

Id.
Id.
SUWA I,425 F.3d at 751.

132Id.
133

Id.
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The SUWA II court then applied these elements to the facts.' 34 The first issue
addressed by the court was whether Congress had given the BLM the authority
necessary for primary jurisdiction. 1 5 The court, relying on the absence of explicit
authority in R.S. 2477, past agency positions, and recent congressional prohibitions on R.S. 2477 rulemaking, concluded that the BLM did not have primary
jurisdiction of R.S. 2477 right-of-way disputes.13
The first rationale the court gave for denying the BLM primary jurisdiction to make binding determinations of the validity of R.S. 2477 claims was the
absence of explicit congressional authority.137 The statutory language of R.S. 2477
3
does not state whether courts or an agency should resolve R.S. 2477 disputes.1 1
The BLM contended that, in the absence of explicit statutory authority, general
statutes giving BLM the authority to administer the public lands provided a sufficient basis for primary jurisdiction.13 1 Specifically, the agency claimed that 43
U.S.C. § 2 (2000) and 43 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000) both give the Secretary of the
Interior broad authority to administer the public lands, including the authority
to make binding administrative determinations concerning the validity of R.S.
2477 claims. 140 The BLM also relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Cameron
v. United States to support its claim of primary jurisdiction. 14 1 In Cameron the
Court held that the Land Department (precursor to the BLM) was permitted to
make a binding determination concerning the validity of an unpatented mining
claim despite the absence of explicit statutory authority. 142 The Cameron Court
stated that in the absence of some direction to the contrary, general statutory
provisions gave the Land Department the authority to adjudicate the validity
of unpatented mining claims. 143 Similarly, the BLM argued in SUWA A, in the
absence of congressional direction to the contrary, the general statutory authority
vested in the Secretary of the Interior provides the authority necessary for primary
44
jurisdiction over R.S. 2477 disputes.
134

Id.

135
Id.
136

Id. at 751-58.

137

SUWA II, 425 E3d at 757.

138 Id. at
139
140

751.

Id. at 752.
Id. 43 U.S.C.

§ 2 (2000) states: "The Secretary of the Interior or such office ...

shall

perform all executive duties appertaining to the surveying and sale of the public lands of the United
States ... and the issuing of patents for all grants of land under the authority of the Government."
43 U.S.C. § 1201 states: "The Secretary of the Interior... is authorized to enforce and carry into
execution, by appropriate regulations, every part of the provisions of Title 32 of the Revised Statutes
not otherwise specifically provided for."
141SUWA I, 425 E3d at 753 (citing Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920)).
142

Id.

143 Id. (citing
144

Cameron, 252 U.S. at 461).

Id.
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The SUWA II court took issue with the comparison drawn between the
unpatented mining claim in Cameron and R.S. 2477 rights-of-way. 145 The court
noted that, with respect to unpatented mining claims, Congress provided a specific
system-the issuance of a patent-for the agency to pass legal title to a claimant
who satisfies certain statutory prerequisites.146 Prior to issuance of a patent, the
BLM has the authority to make binding determinations concerning the validity
of the unpatented mining claim; after issuance of a patent, disputes concerning
the mining claim are resolved in court. 4 7 In R.S. 2477 Congress established a
different system. 14 R.S. 2477 provides no patent process and legal title may pass
independent of any formal agency action. 4 9 Unlike the formal requirements
needed for issuance of a patent for a mining claim, R.S. 2477 requires only "acts
on the part of the grantee sufficient to manifest an intent to accept the congres1
sional offer."' 50
And unlike the patent process for mining claims, "R.S. 2477
creates no executive role for the BLM to play.'' Cameron, the court concluded,
does not stand for the proposition that general statutory provisions provide the
congressional authority necessary for the agency to adjudicate the validity of R.S.
52
2477 rights-of-way.
In addition to the absence of explicit congressional authority to adjudicate
R.S. 2477 claims, the SUWA II court found that longstanding BLM practice
confirmed that the BLM did not historically believe it had primary jurisdiction
over R.S. 2477 disputes. 53 The court observed that "until very recently, the BLM
staunchly maintained that it lacked authority to make binding decisions on R.S.
2477 rights-of-way." 54 In support of this contention, the court referred to several
Interior Board of Land Appeal (IBLA) decisions in which the agency generally
asserted, "'courts [are] . .. the proper forum for determining whether there is a
public highway under [R.S. 2477]." ' 55 Additionally, the court noted that "[t]he
BLM also has been reluctant, until very recently, to issue regulations governing
R.S. 2477 rights-of-way."' 56 For example, from 1939 to 1974 the agency refused

145Id.
146

Id.

147

SUWA IL 425 F.3d at 753-54 (citing Steel v. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co., 106 U.S.

447, 451 (1882); see United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378, 396 (1880)).

SUWA IL425 E3d. at 754.

148

149Id.

150
Id.
151

Id

152MI.
153

SUWA I 425 E3d. at 754.

154Id.

'55Id.at 755 (quoting Leo Titus, Sr., 89 IBLA 323, 337 (1985)).
156MI.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss2/7

16

Azbell: Public Lands -- The Road Less Traveled: The 10th Circuit Adjudica

2007

CASE NOTE

to involve itself in R.S. 2477 disputes."' Moreover, the court noted that Congress
barred the agency from recent attempts to promulgate rules relating to R.S. 2477
by a 1997 omnibus bill. 58 Although the court acknowledged this congressional
prohibition referred only to rulemaking, "its mere existence undercuts the BLM's
primary jurisdiction argument. For primary jurisdiction is appropriate only if R.S.
2477 is an 'issue[] which, under a regulatory scheme, ha[s] been placed within the
special competence of an administrative body."" 59
The court concluded that, in the absence of an explicit grant of congressional
authority, the BLM did not have primary jurisdiction over R.S. 2477 rights-ofway disputes. 6 The court, however, explicitly stated that the agency may make
non-binding adjudications for land use planning purposes.'"' These non-binding
administrative determinations are not given formal legal deference, but may be
used as evidence in litigation. 62 An example of this non-binding administrative
determination procedure, the court stated, was Sierra Club v. Hodel.163 According
to the SUWA II court, Sierra Club v. Hodel was not, as argued by the BLM, a
primary jurisdiction referral, but an opportunity for the agency to "determine its
own position in the litigation."' 164
Because the SUWA II court concluded that the district court abused its discretion when it found the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applied to R.S. 2477
disputes, the case was remanded "to permit the district court to conduct a plenary
review and resolution of the R.S. 2477 claims." 65
ANALYSIS

The SUWA II court's holding, that the DOI does not have primary jurisdiction over R.S. 2477 rights-of-way, instigated a reversal in DOI policy. 166 The
Secretary of the Interior stated that SUWA II "effectively requires the Department
157Id. at 755-56. See, e.g., 43 C.ER. § 244.55 (1939); 43 C.F.R. § 244.58(a) (1963); 43 C.ER.
2822.1-1 (1974).
58SUWA I,425 E3d at 756 (citing Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub.
L. No. 104-208 (1996)).
159 SUWA II, 425 E3d at 756-57 (quoting United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64

(1956)).
Id.at 757 ("[N]othing in the terms of R.S. 2477 gives the BLM authority to make binding

160

determinations on the validity of the rights of way granted thereunder ... [w]e conclude that the
BLM lacks primary jurisdiction .. .
161 SUWA I
425 E3d at 757.

Id. at 758.

162

'63 Id.at 757 (citing Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 E2d. 1068 (10th Cir. 1988)).

165

SUWA IL 425 E3d at 758.
Id.

166

Norton Memo, supra note 98, at 1.

164
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to alter its current administration of R.S. 2477" nationwide. 6 7 Thus, the Hodel
and Babbitt policies were terminated. 68 The DOI will now apply state law, to the
extent it does not conflict with federal law, to make non-binding determinations
concerning the validity of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way, therefore, the possibility of
adopting a nationwide interpretation of R.S. 2477 has been foreclosed. 69 Given
the potential problems of making non-binding R.S. 2477 validity determinations
on a state-by-state basis, the agency urges resolution of R.S. 2477 disputes through
other means, such as "Title V of FLPMA or other right-of-way authorities, recordable disclaimers, and the Quiet Title Act."'17' Because the DOI is prohibited from
making binding determinations on R.S. 2477 claims in the Tenth Circuit, the
DOI has formulated a six-step process for making non-binding validity determinations (NBD).1 7' These NBDs have no force of law, bind neither party, and are
simply a tool for the BLM to plan and manage the land. 72 As will be discussed
below, this nationwide change in DOI policy could have been avoided if the
SUWA HI court would have correctly decided the issue of primary jurisdiction.
Primary jurisdiction, as the SUWA I/court explained, is a prudential doctrine
that allocates responsibility between agencies and courts.173 The application of
the doctrine is used to promote uniformity and to allow agency experts to resolve
complex issues not generally within the normal competence of the judiciary. 74 The
framework for analyzing primary jurisdiction proffered by the SUWA II court is

167Id. at

Attachment 1, 4.

168

Id.

169

Id. ("Thus, while the Department may make non-binding, administrative determinations

for its own land-use planning and management purposes, it cannot create a single national standard
governing the validity of all R.S. 2477 claims, but instead must look to the particular laws of each
State in which a claimed right of way is situated.").
170 Norton Memo, supra note 98, at Attachment 1, 4. Title V of FLPMA permits the granting
of rights-of-way, irrespective of potential R.S. 2477 rights, through recordable disclaimers. See 43
U.S.C. § 1745. However, many groups prefer the use of R.S. 2477 because it requires no administrative process and is subject to fewer restrictions. Recordable disclaimers are discussed in 43
C.ER. § 1864, and derive statutory authority from FLPMA § 315. As asserted by the Memo, these
disclaimers "have the same effect as a quitclaim deed, estopping the United States from asserting a
claim to the interest that is disclaimed." Norton Memo, supra note 98, at Attachment 1, 6. Because
SUVWA II determined that claims to property interest are judicial functions, claimants seeking
"binding determinations of... R.S. 2477 rights . . . must file a claim under the Quiet Title Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2409(a)." Id. For an example of a proposed solution to the problems associated with R.S.
2477 see supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
17 Norton Memo, supra note 98, at Attachment 1, 4.
172

Id.

173 SUWA

II, 425 F.3d 735, 750 (10th Cir. 2005).

174Id.; United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co, 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
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accurate. 175 However, the court reached the wrong conclusion by misapplying the
elements and ignoring important precedent. 176 As acknowledged by the SUWA
II court, analysis of primary jurisdiction involves a three-step process. 177 First,
the court must determine whether Congress has given authority to the agency to
deal with the issue. 78 If authority has been given, the driving question becomes
whether the purpose of the doctrine-uniformity and agency expertise-are
present.179 The second step is to determine if application of the doctrine would
promote uniformity. 80 In the third step, the court inquires as to whether the issue
is one within the normal competency of judges, or whether the issue is better
handled by an agency, given its special expertise.' 8'
Did Congressgive the Bureau of Land Management authority to adjudicate
the validity of R.S. 2477 claims?
The SUWA II court answered this question in the negative, holding that
the BLM may make non-binding, internal determinations of the validity of R.S.
2477 claims for planning purposes, but may not formally adjudicate claims. 8 2 As
will be shown, this conclusion is not only unsupported by precedent, but it has
negative public policy consequences.
In Sierra Club v. Hodel, the Tenth Circuit held that the BLM has primary
jurisdiction over R.S. 2477 rights-of-way when it stated that the "initial determination of whether activity falls within an established right-of-way is to be made
by the BLM and not by the court." 18 3 The SUWA II court rejected reliance on
this case, holding that the Hodel court was merely allowing the BLM to make
non-binding determinations of the scope of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way.184 This
non-binding determination, the SUWA II court stated, was not entitled to any
formal deference in court. 85 However, in Hodel, the district court stated that
175 See W

Pac., 352 U.S. 59; Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchants' Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285

(1922); Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907); Williams Pipe Line
Co. v. Empire Gas Corp., 76 E3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1996); Volkman v. United Transp. Union, 73
E3d 1047 (10th Cir. 1996).
176See infra notes 212-45 and accompanying text.
177SUWA

II, 425 E3d at 751.

7

' Id; W Pac., 352 U.S. at 64.
I, 425 E3d at 751. See Tex. &Pac. Ry. Co., 204 U.S. at 440-41 (promotion of

179SUWA

uniformity); Great N. Ry. Co., 259 U.S. 285 (agency expertise).

"I SUWA I, 425 E3d at 751.
181Id.

182Id. at 758.
83Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 E2d 1068, 1084-85 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing City & County of

Denver v. Bergland, 695 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1982)).
114SUWA II, 425 F.3d at 758.
185

Id.
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it "should pay considerable deference to the BLM's experience" in determining
the scope of the R.S. 2477 right-of-way in question. The considerable deference
given to the BLM's findings is not the de novo standard the SUWA II court stated
should apply to non-binding determinations." 86 Moreover, in order to determine
the scope of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way, the issue in question in Hodel on appeal,
the BLM must first determine whether the right-of-way is valid in the first place.
Therefore, Hodel requires the application of primary jurisdiction to R.S. 2477
disputes.
Assuming arguendo that the issue of primary jurisdiction had not been previously addressed, an analogy may be drawn to other mineral laws. The Mining
Act of 1872 provides a useful comparison because of its similarities with R.S.
2477.187 Aside from sharing common language originating from the same 1866
statute, the property interest in an unpatented mining claim and an R.S. 2477
right-of-way require the establishment of certain statutory prerequisites before
any interest is conveyed. To establish a valid R.S. 2477 right-of-way the claimant
must "construct" a "highway" on "land not reserved for public use"; to establish
a valid unpatented mining claim the claimant must discover a valuable mineral
on public land. 88 Further, the unpatented mining claim, like an R.S. 2477 rightof-way, requires no governmental action in order for the courts to recognize its
validity and give the owner proper protection.' 89 Finally, the unpatented mining
claim, similar to a perfected R.S. 2477 claim, does not give the owner unfettered
rights, but both claims are subject to the rules and regulations of the owner of the
1

16

187

See id. at 750.
See generally Birdsong, supra note 28, at 557-64. The language found in R.S. 2477, section

one, is almost identical to that found in the Mining Act of 1877. Section one of R.S. 2477 states
the following:
[T]he mineral lands of the public domain, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are
herby declared to be free and open to exploration and occupation by all citizens
of the United States, and those who have declared their intention to become
citizens, subject to such regulation as may be prescribed by law, and subject
also to the local customs or rules of miners in the several mining districts, so far
as the same may not be in conflict with the laws of the United States.
30 U.S.C. §§ 22-23 (2000). The Mining Act of 1872, codified as 30 U.S.C. § 22, states:
Except as otherwise provided, all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States, both surveyed and unsurveyed, shall be free and
open to exploration and purchase, and the lands in which they are found to
occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States and those who have
declared their intention to become such, under regulations prescribed by law,
and according to the local customs or rules of miners in the several mining
districts, so far as the same are applicable and not inconsistent with the laws
of the United States.
30 U.S.C. § 22 (2000).
4
188 See 3 U.S.C. § 932 (repealed in 1976 by FLPMA) (discussing requirements for R.S. 2477);
United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968) (discussing requirements for mining claim).
189 See Birdsong, supra note 28, at 560.
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dominant estate, the United States government.19 ° Given the similarities between
the unpatented mining claim and the R.S. 2477 right-of-way, it is informative to
examine how the courts have dealt with the Mining Act in relation to primary
jurisdiction. As will be shown below, the same authorities allowing primary jurisdiction in the unpatented mining claim context should permit primary jurisdiction in the R.S. 2477 context.
In 1920, the Supreme Court established that the Land Department had
authority to adjudicate the validity of unpatented mining claims in Cameron v.
United States.' 91 Cameron claimed to have perfected a valid mining claim on the
rim of the Grand Canyon. 192 The Secretary of the Interior, in the context of a
patent hearing, denied his application for a patent because the claim did not
fulfill statutory prerequisites. 193 Cameron appealed, claiming that, "although the
Secretary had ample authority to determine whether Cameron was entitled to a
patent, he was without authority to determine the character of the land or the
question of discovery, or to pronounce the claim invalid."1 94 The Supreme Court
acknowledged that the Mining Act did not explicitly confer authority on the
agency to determine the validity of an unpatented mining claim but nonetheless
rejected Cameron's claim, holding that "in the absence of some direction to the
contrary, the general statutory provisions before mentioned vest [authority] in the
' 195
Land Department."
90

See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104 (1985). See also SUWA H, 425 F.3d at 747-48
(holding that R.S. 2477 rights-of-way are not tantamount to fee-simple ownership, and those seeking new construction must consult with the BLM); Birdsong, supra note 28, at 560.
191Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
'

192 Id.at

4

57.

193Id.
94

1

Id. at 459.

Id. at 461 (citing Nesqally v. Gibbon, 158 U.S. 155 (1895)). See also Cameron, 252 U.S.
at 463 (stating that to hold otherwise "would encourage the use of merely colorable mining locations in the wrongful private appropriation ..."of public lands). The Land Department is now
the Department of the Interior. The general statutory provisions cited by the Cameron Court as
providing agency authority to adjudicate the validity of unpatented mining claims included Revised
Statutes §§ 441, 453, and 2478, which were codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1457, 2, and 1201. Section
1457 states: "The Secretary of the Interior is charged with the supervision of public business relating
to the following subjects and agencies: . . . 4. Bureau of Land Management." 43 U.S.C. § 1457
(2000). Section 2 of title 43 of the United States Code states the following:
195

The Secretary of the Interior or such officer as he may designate shall perform
all executive duties appertaining to the surveying and sale of the public lands of
the United States, or in anywise respecting such public lands, and, also, such as
relate to private claims of land, and the issuing of patents for all grants of land
under the authority of the Government.
43 U.S.C. § 12 (2000). Section 1201 of title 43 of the United States Code states: The Secretary of
the Interior, or such officer as he may designate, is authorized to enforce and carry into execution, by
appropriate regulations, every part of the provisions of Title 32 of the Revised Statutes not otherwise
specially provided for. 43 U.S.C. § 1201.
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Forty-three years later, in Best v. Humboldt PlacerMining Company, the Court
reestablished the principle that general statutory provisions vest authority in the
DOI to determine the validity of unpatented mining claims.' 96 In Best, the United
States sought to build a dam on federal lands.' 97 Humboldt claimed to have an
unpatented mining claim on the land in question.'98 The United States sued in
district court to condemn the property and asked the court to allow the BLM
to conduct administrative proceedings to determine the validity of the claim.' 99
After the district court granted the United States' request for agency adjudication,
Humboldt brought suit to enjoin the proceedings. °° The district court granted
summary judgment to the United States, the appeals court reversed, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the agency was permitted
to adjudicate the validity of the claim. °1 The Court first noted that, although
underlying legal title to unpatented mining claims is retained by the United
States, the "claims are, however, valid against the United States," if the "statutory
requirements have been met." 20 2 The Court concluded that Congress had given
the DOI plenary authority to administer the public lands, including the authority
to adjudicate the validity of unpatented mining claims. 20 3 Moreover, not only
did the Court permit such proceedings, but it stated "[i]t is difficult to imagine
a more appropriate case for invocation of the jurisdiction of an administrative
24
agency." 0
In sum, as articulated by Professor Bret Birdsong, Cameronand Best stand for
the following principles:
First, they establish that the Secretary of the Interior's authority
to decide the validity of mining claims . . . , despite the lack
of specific authorization, is necessarily incident to the congressionally-delegated general authority over the disposition and use
of public lands. Second, these cases recognize the specialized
expertise of DOI, whose "province is that of determining questions of fact and right under the public land laws, of recognizing
or disapproving claims according to their merits, and of granting
or refusing patents as the law may give sanction for the one or

196Best v. Humboldt Placer Min. Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963).
'97

Id. at 334-35.

198Id.
199
200

Id.

Id.

20' Best, 371 U.S. at 335.
202

Id. at 336.

203 Id. at 339. The statutes cited by the Court giving the DOI plenary power include 43 U.S.C.
1201, quoted at supra note 195.

204Best, 371 U.S. at 338.
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the other."2 05 Third, the cases reflect the Court's recognition that
the disposition of public lands is a matter of substantial public
interest, and that Congress has entrusted the Secretary of the
Interior with the protection of that interest, subject to review
20 6
by courts.
The above principles apply equally to R.S. 2477 rights-of-way. 207 Thus, the
same general statutory provisions that apply to the unpatented mining claim--43
U.S.C. sections 2, 12, 1201, and 1457-should also vest authority in the Secretary
to adjudicate R.S. 2477 disputes. 20 8 In these statutes, "Congress has entrusted DOI
with administration of the public lands, including land grants. ' 20 9 For example,
43 U.S.C. § 1201 provides authority to the Secretary of the Interior to "enforce
and carry into execution, by appropriate regulations, every part of the provisions
of Title 32 of the Revised Statutes." 2'0 Title 32 of the Revised Statutes originally
encompassed R.S. 2477.21 Thus, section 1201 expressly provides the Secretary
authority over R.S. 2477 rights-of-way. While this authority does not explicitly
grant the Secretary of the Interior the power to adjudicate R.S. 2477 disputes, this
power "isnecessarily incident to the congressionally delegated general authority
over the disposition and use of public lands." 21 2Therefore, the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction applies to R.S. 2477 claims as it does to unpatented mining claims.
The SUWA II court, however, expressly rejected Cameron and the analogy
between the unpatented mining claim and R.S. 2477 rights-of-way, holding that
general statutory provisions do not vest authority in the BLM over R.S. 2477
disputes. 213 The SUWA II court's rationale for finding Cameron inapplicable was
based on the fact that R.S. 2477 rights-of-way require no patent for legal title
to pass, while mining claims require issuance of a patent prior to conveyance of
legal title. 21 4 Because the patent process is the means by which the agency ensures
statutory requirements have been satisfied, the absence of a patent process, the

205Birdsong,
206

supra note 28, at 564-65 (citing Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 478 (1963)).

Id.

207 See id.at 565.
208See supra note 195.
209Birdsong,
21043

supra note 28, at 565.

U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).

211Id.
212See

Birdsong, supra note 28, at 563-64.

213SUWA

II, 425 F.3d at 753-57.

214 See

SUWA II,
425 E3d at 753 ("However, this argument ignores a fundamental difference
between mining claims and R.S. 2477 rights of way: title to a mining claim passes by means of a
patent ....Title to an R.S. 2477 right-of-way, by contrast, passes without any procedural formalities and without any agency involvement.").
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court concluded, leaves "no executive role for the BLM to play."21 5 The alleged
passage of legal title, the court believed, forms the line of demarcation between
court and agency adjudicative authority: prior to passage of legal title, the DOI
may determine the validity of claims against the public lands; after passage of legal
16
title, courts are vested with the sole authority to adjudicate public land disputes.
The SUWA II court's argument is erroneous because it assumes that after legal
title passes the agency is divested of authority to adjudicate the interest conveyed.
This contention was expressly rejected in Boesche v. Udall.2 17 Additionally, the
court ignores the fact that a mining patent passes title only to the surface; even
without a patent, a valid mining claim gives title to the minerals." 8
Boesche arose in the context of the Mineral Leasing Act, not the Mining
Act.219 Mineral leases, unpatented mining claims, and R.S. 2477 rights-of-way
are different property interests. 20 The principle underlying Boesche, however,
applies as much to R.S. 2477 rights-of-way as to mineral leases. 221 In Boesche
v.Udall, the petitioner was awarded an 80-acre, non-competitive mineral lease
by Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall. 222 Udall later realized that the lease
awarded to Boesche failed to meet the statutory prerequisites and sought to cancel
it. 223 Boesche objected, claiming the Secretary did not hold such power because
the Mineral Leasing Act permits cancellation of leases only when the lessee fails
to comply with the lease terms.224 Since Boesche was in compliance with the lease
terms the Secretary was powerless to cancel the lease. 225 The Court, citing Cameron
215

Id. at 754. "In fact," the court stated, "because there were no notice or filing require-

ments of any kind, R.S. 2477 rights of way may have been established-and legal title may have
passed-without the BLM ever being aware of it." Id.
216 Id. at

754-55 n.6. ("Only after a patent issues is the claim perfected, and from that point

onward, issues regarding the nature and extent of the property right are resolved in court." (citing
United States v. Schruz, 102 U.S. 378, 396)).
217Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472 (1963).
218See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 86 (1985):
"Discovery" of a mineral deposit, followed by the minimal procedures required
to formally "locate" the deposit, gives an individual the right of exclusive possession of the land for mining purposes, 30 U.S.C. § 26 .... For a nominal

sum, and after certain statutory conditions are fulfilled, an individual may
patent the claim, thereby purchasing from the Federal Government the land
and minerals and obtaining ultimate title to them. Patenting, however, is not
required, and an unpatented mining claim remains a fully recognized possessory interest.
219Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 181-263 (2000).
220See supra note 187-90 and accompanying text (discussing similarities between unpatented
mining claim and R.S. 2477 rights-of-way).
22 See Birdsong, supra note 28, at 563-66.
222Boesche, 373

U.S. at 474.

223 Id.

224Id.at

475.

225 Boesche, 373

U.S. at 475.
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and Best for analogous support, rejected the notion that the Mineral Leasing Act
was the sole source of statutory power, and held that Congress gave the Secretary
broad power to manage public lands, including the power to administratively
cancel leases. 226 This authority is assumed present unless Congress had expressly
withdrawn it. 2 7 The Court concluded the Secretary had the power to cancel the
lease because Congress had not withdrawn authority.228 In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the distinction between equitable title interests and legal
title interests and stated:
We are not persuaded by petitioner's argument-based on
cases holding that land patents once delivered and accepted
could be canceled only in judicial proceedings (e.g. Johnson v.
Townsley, 13 Wall. 72 [(1871)] ... Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530
[(1877)] . . .)-that the administrative cancellation power
established by Cameron and the other cases cited is confined
to so-called equitable interests, and that a lease, which is said
to resemble more closely the legal interest conveyed by patent,
is not subject to such power. We think that no matter how the
interest conveyed is denominated the true line of demarcation
is whether as a result of the transaction "allauthority or control"
over the lands has passedfrom "the Executive Department,"...
or whether the Government continues to possess some measure of
2 29
control over them.
Thus, contrary to the SUWA II court's opinion, the real test for whether the BLM
retains authority over R.S. 2477 rights-of-way is not whether legal title has passed,
but whether the BLM "continues to possess some measure of control" over the
right-of-way.
One need not look any further than the SUWA Hcourt's opinion to determine
whether the government continues to possess any measure of control over the
rights-of-way.2 0 In response to the Counties' argument that notification to the
BLM is not necessary to begin new construction on R.S. 2477 rights-of-ways, the
court stated: "right of way is not tantamount to fee simple ownership of a defined
territory." 231 Numerous other cases also demonstrate that the BLM retains control

226

Id. at 476.

227

Id.

221

Id. at 485.

229

Boesche, 373 U.S. at 477 (quoting Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 533 (1877)) (emphasis

added).
210

SUWA II, 425 E3d 735, 748 (10th Cir. 2005).

231

Id
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over R.S. 2477 rights-of-way. 2 2 The interest conveyed in R.S. 2477 right-of-way
is not in dispute: "the United States owns a fee interest subject to a right-of-way,
in the nature of an easement, for the construction of highways. '23 3 Therefore,
under the Boesche standard, the BLM's authority to adjudicate R.S. 2477 claims is
not extinguished by the alleged passing of legal title, but continues because of the
agency's continuing ownership of underlying land and continued control over the
rights-of-way.
The SUWA II court's additional rationales for denying the BLM primary
jurisdiction over R.S. 2477 disputes are equally unavailing. Relying on past agency
actions and a 1997 Omnibus Act which prohibited the agency from making "final
rules or regulations," the court contented that Congress did not give the BLM
authority to adjudicate R.S. 2477 claims. 234 The 1997 Omnibus Act states, in its
entirety:
No final rule or regulation of any agency of the Federal
Government pertaining to the recognition, management, or
validity of a right-of-way pursuant to Revised Statute 2477 (43
U.S.C. [§] 932) shall take effect unless expressly authorized by
an Act of Congress subsequent to the date of enactment of this
Act [Sept. 30, 1996].235
236
The distinction between agency rulemaking and adjudication is well established.
"Agency rulemaking sets a prospective standard of conduct," whereas "agency
adjudication by individual order resolves an individual dispute by retrospectively
applying law and policy to particular facts. '23 7 Surely Congress was aware of
this distinction when it passed the bill. The fact that agency adjudication was
omitted from the statute indicates that Congress did not intend to curtail this
authority.238

212

See, e.g.,United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638 (9th Cit. 1988), cert. denied,488 U.S. 1006

(1989) (holding that the National Park Service had authority to regulate access and mining within

Alaska's national parks); United States v. Garfield County, 122 E Supp. 2d 1201 (D. Utah 2000)
(holding that the county must consult with the NPS and get permission prior to widening an

existing R.S. 2477 right-of-way).
233 Birdsong, supra note 28, at 565 (citing Vogler v. United States, 859 F.2d 638, 642 (9th Cir.
1988)).
234

See SUWA II, 425 F.3d at 756.

235

Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208 (1996).

236

See 5 U.S.C. §

551(4), 551(7) (2000) (agency rulemaking and agency adjudication,

respectively).
237See

Brief of Federal Appellee at 30, SUWA v. BLM, 425 E3d 735, Nos. 04-4071, 04-4073

(10th Cit. 2004).
238 See id. The

SUWA II court responded that the prohibition referred only to final rules or

regulations because the BLM never had the authority to adjudicate R.S. 2477 disputes. SUWA
II, 425 E3d at 756 ("there was . . . no such authority to preserve."). This ignores the fact that the
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As additional support for the lack of primary jurisdiction, the court, referring
to a series of state court opinions, averred that "[u]ntil very recently, the BLM
staunchly maintained that it lacked authority to make binding decisions on R.S.
2477 rights of way. '239 These cases, however, simply do not support the claim the
BLM has "staunchly maintained" the lack of authority to adjudicate R.S. 2477
claims, but, instead, demonstrate only that it had declined to do so in the past.240
Additionally, the SUWA I!court bolstered its conclusion by reference to the 1993
DOI Report to Congress.24 1 In its report, the DOI acknowledged that "[c]ourts
must ultimately dertermine [sic] the validity of such [R.S. 2477] claims. '242 The
passage, read in context, "states generally that BLM does not make binding R.S.
2477 determinations, but does not state that the BLM lacks the authority to make
binding R.S. 2477 determinations if it chooses to do so. ' ' 243 Moreover, policy
statements found in reports do not legally bind the agency or have the force of
law.244
After examination of the SUWA II court's argument and case precedents,
it is clear that Congress, by general statutory provisions, permitted the BLM to
adjudicate claims concerning the validity of R.S. 2477. However, for the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction to apply, the twin goals of the doctrine must also be
24 5
present.

Would applying the doctrine ofprimaryjurisdiction to R.S. 2477 claims
promote regulatory uniformity?
The SUWA II court never had occasion to reach this question specifically
because it concluded that Congress never gave the BLM authority to adjudicate

BLM had been attempting to adjudicate R.S. 2477 disputes in the past. See supra notes 89-94 and
accompanying text. Surely Congress would have been aware of this fact and taken action accordingly to prohibit R.S. 2477 adjudication.
239 SUWA II, 425 F.3d at 754.
240

See Brief of Federal Appellee, supra note 237, at 26. For example, the SUWA II court relied

on the following to back up its assertion that the BLM had maintained that it lacked authority to
adjudicate R.S. 2477 claims: Kirk Brown, 151 IBLA 221, 227 n.6 (1999) ("Normally, the existence
of an R.S. 2477 road is a question of state law for adjudication by state courts."); James S. Mitchell,
William Dawson, 104 IBLA 377, 381 (1988) ("[Tlhe Department has taken the consistent position
that, as a general proposition, state courts are the proper forum for determining whether, pursuant
to [R.S. 2477], a road is properly deemed to be a 'public highway."').
241 SUWA
,425 E3d at 755.
242

DOI Rep. to Congress, supra note 35, at 25.

243

Brief of Federal Appellee, supra note 237, at 26.

244 SeenAm. Mining Cong. v. Marshall, 671 F.2d 1251, 1263 (10th Cit. 1982).
245

SUWA I,425 F3d 735, 751 (10th Cit. 2005). As discussed previously, the twin aims of

primary jurisdiction are to promote uniformity and allow agencies with special expertise decide
issues generally outside the competence of judges.
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R.S. 2477.246 However, in the court's opinion concerning the application of federal
and state law, the court stated that R.S. 2477 has been applied without any unified
standard for over 130 years, and concluded that there is no need for a uniform
policy.24 7 The court reasoned that specific areas, such as Alaska, require unique
policies. 248 Applying state law would ensure that policies responded to each state's
distinctive geographic environments. 249 In this respect, the court erred.
Allowing the BLM to adjudicate claims using a federal standard "would enable
the agency to impose a uniform interpretation of the terms of the grant, something that piecemeal adjudication has failed to provide. '250 Moreover, contrary
to the SUWA II court's decision, a national uniform policy is necessary to serve
agency goals articulated in FLMPA. 251 For example, FLPMA requires the BLM
to manage the lands for multiple use and sustained yield and to "take any action
necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation. '25 2 Although the agency
may not diminish or reduce a right-of-way established prior to 1976, the agency
has a statutory duty to prevent claimants from asserting bogus R.S. 2477 claims if
they would unnecessarily degrade the environment. 253 Prior to taking action and
developing land use planning documents, the agency must know if a dry creek
bed or old foot trail is a valid R.S. 2477 right-of-way. However, as evidenced by
the past, courts have interpreted R.S. 2477 differently. 25 4 Agency adjudication
would allow for the development of a uniform statutory standard and, over time,
provide a body of agency precedents that would ensure greater predictability.
Private land owners also would benefit from agency adjudication. 255 Federal
lands sold to individuals are subject to preexisting R.S. 2477 rights-of-way. 256
Given the informal nature of the grant, these rights-of-way do not generally

246

SUWA I, 425 F.3d at 749-58.

247 Id.

at 766-67.

24,

Id. at 767.

249

Id.

255 Birdsong, supra note 28, at 566.
251

43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000). As acknowledged by the SUWA I court, "Congress has specifi-

cally stated that determination of the validity of R.S. 2477 claims 'should be drawn from the intent
of R.S. 2477 and FLPMA.'" SUWA 1, 147 E Supp. 2d 1130, 1138 (D. Utah 2001) (citing H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 10-5503 (1992)).
252 43 U.S.C. § 1701(7); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).
253 Cf Mineral Policy Center v. Norton, 292 E Supp. 2d 30, 42 (D D.C. 2003) ("FLPMA, by

its plain terms, vests the Secretary of the Interior with the authority-and indeed the obligation-to
disapprove of an otherwise permissible mining operation because the operation, though necessary
for mining, would unduly harm or degrade the public land.").
254See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
255 See generally Brief of Amici

Curiae, Property Owners for Sensible Roads Policy and Jana and

Ron Smith, SUWA v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735, Nos. 04-4071, 04-4073 (1Oth Cir. 2005).
256 Id.
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show up in title searches. 25 7 Often the first sign of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way on
private property comes from an individual boldly asserting his or her rights.258
For example, the Chamberlins, homeowners living in the mountains outside of
Boulder, Colorado, purchased a home without notice of any existing rights-ofway.25 9 Thereafter, recreational users, asserting an R.S. 2477 right-of-way, tore
down no trespassing signs and drove recreational vehicles across the property, day
and night. 26 ° Not only was the Chamberlins' property affected, but the neighbors
experienced increased noise, diminished property values, and vandalism due to
the recreational users' activities.26' In protest to the Chamberlins' insistence on
blocking access, recreational users smashed a neighbor's car windows and killed
one of the neighbor's dogs. 262 The application of a national unified standard would
make it easier for private land owners to determine whether their property is
subject to R.S. 2477 rights-of-way, and therefore, better understand and enforce
their rights.

Would applying the doctrine ofprimaryjurisdiction to R.S. 2477 allow
agency experts to resolve complex issues not generally within the normal
competence of the judiciary?
As SUWA !and SUWA Idemonstrate, the adjudication of R.S. 2477 disputes
is a highly factual determination. 263 Old maps and photographs must be located,
testimony concerning prior land uses must be taken, city and county maintenance
logs must be dug up, personnel must be deployed to investigate current and past
road conditions, and comment and evidence must be submitted by the contesting
parties. 264 For example, in the principal case, the BLM evaluated the proposed
"Devil's Garden" right-of-way by reference to site inspections, BLM and geological surveys, aerial photographs, land survey systems, wilderness inventories,
BLM maintenance records, BLM planning documents, project records for the
Federal Highway Administration, and letters and interviews from constituency
groups. 26 5 After this extensive review of the record, the agency concluded that no
right-of-way had been established. 266 Certainly, most judges do not have access to

257Property

Owners for Sensible Roads Policy, http://www.posrp.org/Testimony°/o20by%/2OAJ.

htm (last visited March 8, 2007).
258

Id.

259 Id
260 Id.
261Id.
262

Brief of Amici Curiae, Property Owners for Sensible Roads Policy and Jana and Ron Smith,

supra note 255, at 7.
263 SUWA I, 147 E Supp. 2d 1130, 1137-38 (D. Utah 2001).
264

Id. at 1137.

265

Id.

266

Id.
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this kind of information, and would not have the expertise or time to analyze it if
they did. As summarized by Professor Birdsong, "[a]n agency process that allows
for the application of agency expertise through extensive field investigations into
claims, broad public participation and input would enhance the quality of the
factual determinations and their consistency with the purposes of modern federal
land management laws."267 It is clear that the BLM possesses special expertise not
generally within the normal competency of judges. Therefore, the third element
required for primary jurisdiction, special agency expertise outside the competence
of judges, is present.
Given that all three elements of primary jurisdiction are presentCongressional approval, regulatory uniformity, and agency expertise-the SUWA
II court should have affirmed the district court's decision to allow the BLM to
make binding adjudications.
CONCLUSION

Since its repeal in 1976, R.S. 2477 has been plagued with uncertainty. State
and federal cases have reached varying results, and DOI and BLM policy has been
inconsistent. Given the indeterminable nature of R.S. 2477 claims, increased
litigation, and more stringent management mandates under FLPMA, the need for
a uniform national policy for the statute has never been greater. SUWA I, applying
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, opened the door for the BLM to make binding adjudications of R.S. 2477 claims, subject to judicial review. However, just as
the door opened, the SUWA II court slammed it shut again. The SUWA II court,
while clarifying some unresolved questions, foreclosed the possibility of binding
BLM adjudication. Not only was this decision reached in error, but, without
primary jurisdiction, the uncertainty created by piecemeal court decisions will.
It is clear that Congress must now do what the SUWA II court forbade: pass
legislation allowing agency adjudication of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way.

267

Birdsong, supra note 28, at 566.
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